Below is my opinion on the pardon of Maryam Sanda, a case that sits at the intersection of justice, mercy, gender, and social order. While one can sympathize with some of the mitigating circumstances, I believe that in this instance, the pardon raises serious questions about the nature of justice, precedent, and the capacity of the State to balance compassion with the rule of law.
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| sandra and bello |
Background summary (as context, not excuse as well)
Maryam Sanda was convicted in January 2020 of culpable homicide for the killing of her husband, Bilyaminu Bello, in their home [ABUJA]. The court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. She was sentenced to death by hanging. After spending approximately six years and eight months in custody, she was granted a presidential pardon by President Bola Tinubu, reportedly on account of her “good conduct in custody,” remorse, pleas from her family, and the interests of her two children.
This pardon was part of a broader clemency granted to many convicts, 175 others, who showed remorse and met other criteria such as age, vocational achievements, and rehabilitation milestones.
The moral gravity: crime, punishment, and state authority
At the heart of this case lies a tragic death. Regardless of the motivations or context, someone lost their life. The State has an obligation to act not only as guarantor of rights but also as the dispenser of justice, ensuring that the sanctity of life is respected, that crimes are deterred, and that victims and society receive recognition that wrongdoing carries consequences.
When a State pardons an individual convicted of killing, it must tread carefully. Clemency is one of the reserved powers of the executive, and in liberal frameworks, it serves as a corrective to possible miscarriage, a counterbalance to excessive punishment, or a marker of mercy in exceptional circumstances. But it must not erode the moral and legal foundations that allow citizens to trust that justice is meaningful.
A pardon in a homicide case sends ripples of moral implication. It suggests that the State, under certain circumstances, is willing to set aside the most severe penalties. That is a weighty decision, and doing so requires compelling justification.
Arguments in favor of the pardon (and their weaknesses)
Supporters of the pardon may make the following arguments. I examine each and point out its limitations.
1. Humanitarian concern for children and family
One oft-cited rationale is the welfare of innocent dependents, the children whose lives are disrupted by the incarceration of a parent. The pardon was partly justified on grounds that freeing her would serve the interests of her two children.
This is not a trivial consideration. Children often pay a heavy price when parents are imprisoned, experiencing psychological trauma, social stigma, poverty, and disrupted care. In a compassionate polity, we might accept that family bonds and the welfare of dependents weigh in favor of mercy.
However, this reason cannot by itself outweigh the necessity of upholding the law and ensuring that sentences for grave crimes are not rendered symbolic. If every convict of a serious crime were pardoned for the sake of dependents, the notion of punishment would become hollow. Moreover, the children’s welfare could be supported in other ways, such as social programs, child support, or rehabilitation, rather than unconditional release.
2. Good conduct, remorse, and rehabilitation
Another argument is that during her years in custody, Maryam must have demonstrated good behavior, repentance, and possibly engaged in rehabilitative activities. Indeed, the pardon announcement cited her “remorse and embrace of a new lifestyle.” Clemency in many jurisdictions is premised on transformation. If a person has genuinely changed, maybe they no longer merit the maximum punishment.
This is a legitimate principle. The purpose of punishment is not only retribution but also rehabilitation and deterrence. If a person has reformed, that provides moral force to grant mercy.
Yet, two caveats remain:
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The sincerity and depth of remorse are difficult to gauge. Behavior in prison does not always predict future conduct outside, especially under real-world pressures.
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Good behavior in prison is expected; it is the baseline, not exceptional. Unless a convict has gone far beyond expectations, for example through extraordinary service or exceptional penitent work, good conduct alone is not always sufficient to undermine the gravity of the original crime.
3. Mercy and the exercising of executive clemency
The idea that rulers should show mercy is ancient. To temper justice with mercy is a noble principle. In some cases, clemency is needed to correct rigidities in the law and to address inequities.
In that sense, the pardon is legally permissible. Constitutions often vest residual power in the head of state to grant clemency. The executive may rightly see that justice sometimes calls for tempering severity, especially when the person has already spent significant time in custody.
However, mercy must not become arbitrariness or favoritism. If pardons are widely granted in serious cases, then the deterrent effect of criminal law may be undermined, and public trust in the impartiality and effectiveness of justice will erode. Mercy is proper only when applied to exceptional cases, not as a norm.
Arguments against the pardon (stronger in my judgment)
While the arguments above have merit, I believe the arguments opposing or cautioning against the pardon are stronger. I outline them below.
1. Undermining deterrence and consistency in criminal justice
One of the fundamental functions of penalty is deterrence, to discourage would-be offenders by showing that grave wrongdoing carries severe consequences. If the State pardons a person convicted of killing their spouse, it risks diluting that message. Observers may conclude that if one can show remorse and wait long enough, even the gravest crime might be forgiven.
Consistency is equally important. The justice system must treat like cases alike. If Maryam receives a pardon, what about others convicted of homicide or worse? The public may see a double standard, especially if access to pardon becomes tied to influence, publicity, or political connections.
Moreover, in Nigeria, where homicide, domestic violence, and sexual violence are serious societal problems, the message matters. A pardon in one high-profile case sends a signal not only to potential offenders but also to victims and survivors, suggesting that justice can sometimes be circumvented. That may undercut confidence in the State’s capacity to protect life.
2. The dignity and memory of the victim
Every act of homicide includes a victim whose life is extinguished. In granting a pardon, the State must consider not only the offender’s transformation but also the dignity owed to the victim and his surviving kin. The victim cannot speak, and the pardon might look like a marginalization of the wrong done to him.
The State should ideally balance compassion for the offender with acknowledgment of the harm to the victim and society. In some legal systems, pardons in homicide cases require consultation of the victim’s family, restitution, or strong justification. It is unclear from the reports whether the victim’s family’s views were solicited or considered in the decision.
3. Precedent, perception, and political risk
The pardon is not in isolation. Reports indicate the president also pardoned or reduced sentences for 175 other convicts, covering a wide spectrum: illegal miners, white-collar convicts, remorseful drug offenders, and foreigners. When many are pardoned, including serious offenders, the risk of negative public perception is greater. The public may suspect favoritism or political calculation rather than pure justice.
In a country like Nigeria, where impunity is already a major grievance, granting pardons in homicide cases might feed the narrative that the powerful or well-connected can avoid full accountability. Even if Maryam were not especially influential, the optics are difficult to manage.
When pardons become expected or frequent rather than exceptional acts of mercy, they lose moral force and become subject to cynicism. The executive’s prerogative should be used sparingly, not expansively.
4. The risk of recidivism or untested release
While good conduct in custody is a positive factor, it is not a guarantee of safe return to society. The transition from a controlled prison environment to freedom involves stressors, relationships, and socioeconomic pressures. Unless comprehensive post-release support, psychological counseling, social integration programs, and monitoring are put in place, a pardon may create latent risk.
It is unclear from reports whether the pardon includes conditional release terms, supervision, rehabilitation programs, or aftercare. Without such safeguards, the pardon may be hasty.
5. Erosion of legal finality and respect for the courts
The pardon seems to bypass or undercut the status of the legal process and the finality of judgment. The courts had adjudicated, evidence was considered, and verdict and sentence delivered. While appellate avenues exist, once judicial process runs its course, the pardon should not become a backdoor reversal without rigorous scrutiny. Overuse or misuse of pardon could reduce respect for judicial decisions, undercut separation of powers, and invite retaliatory pardons in politically motivated cases.
Situational and contextual caveats
To be fair, this is a complex and tragic case. The moral and legal lines are not always sharply drawn. Some contextual factors should be considered.
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The facts of the case may contain mitigating details not fully captured in media reports. Perhaps she acted under severe provocation, threat, or emotional stress. If so, those could have warranted leniency, though not complete exoneration.
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The quality and fairness of her trial may have been imperfect, with delays, adjournments, and missing witnesses. If there was procedural shortcoming, one might argue that a pardon is a partial corrective, though ideally one would address systemic reform, not pardon after the fact.
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The longer she had served in custody, the stronger the argument that she has already borne much of the punishment. Six years and eight months in a harsh prison environment is itself a serious deprivation.
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Public sentiment and pressure sometimes play a role in clemency decisions. In a case that has received attention, the executive may feel compelled to show mercy, especially where compelling human interest stories are foregrounded.
These do not invalidate the risks I have laid out, but they do suggest that blanket condemnation may be unwarranted too.
What I would have preferred: a balanced, conditional approach
If I were designing a more prudent pathway, I would favor a conditional, monitored, restorative release rather than an unconditional pardon. Such an approach recognizes the severity of the crime but allows mercy under strict oversight. Features might include:
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Probationary period with supervision: Release could be conditional on strict supervision, reporting to a parole office, periodic checks, psychological evaluation, and compliance with terms.
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Mandatory rehabilitation and counseling: Structured counseling, anger management, trauma therapy, and reintegration programs should be required.
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Community restitution or symbolic compensation: Participation in community service or formal apology toward the victim’s family to signal acknowledgment of harm.
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Consultation with the victim’s family: Their views should be sought and given weight.
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Transparent criteria and reporting: The executive should publish reasons for the pardon, mitigating factors, and specifics of behavior in custody.
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Limited to exceptional cases: Clemency should remain exceptional, not routine, particularly for serious crimes.
Such an approach would preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system while still allowing mercy in carefully controlled circumstances.
Broader implications for Nigeria
The Maryam Sanda pardon reveals deeper issues in Nigeria’s criminal justice, executive accountability, and social expectations.
1. The need for criminal justice reform
Delays, adjournments, inconsistent legal representation, and disappearing witnesses are symptoms of deep systemic weakness. If justice is poorly administered, pardons may become patches rather than correcting root causes. The State must improve investigation, prosecution, defense support, timely trials, and judicial independence.
2. Trust and legitimacy
Public trust in government and courts is fragile. When pardons in homicide cases are granted, some citizens will see selective justice. Transparent, principled clemency with clear standards is critical to preserving trust.
3. Gender, domestic violence, and inequality
Many domestic homicide cases involve fraught power dynamics, oppression, and emotional trauma. In a society where women often suffer violence in silence, retaliation can sometimes be an act born out of desperation. Thus, no pardon should obscure the need for better protection of vulnerable spouses and prevention of domestic violence.
4. Setting precedent for political risk
Future executives may feel emboldened to pardon convicts for political advantage, social favor, or media sympathy. The executive clemency power must be kept from becoming an instrument of patronage or populism.
Conclusion: mercy must walk hand in hand with justice
The pardon of Maryam Sanda is a fraught decision. On the one hand, mercy, human compassion, and recognition of rehabilitation deserve respect. On the other, the gravest crimes demand outcomes that affirm the rule of law, deliver justice for victims, and preserve deterrent force.
In my view, the pardon was too broad and insufficiently calibrated. At the very least, it should have been conditional, tied to oversight, rehabilitation, and accountability. If the executive is to pardon homicide convicts, it must do so rarely, transparently, and with safeguards that ensure justice is not hollowed out.
Moving forward, Nigeria must strengthen its criminal justice system, combat impunity, and address social root causes of domestic violence. Pardons in serious cases should never substitute for systemic improvements; they must be exceptional, not expected. If the State is to pardon someone who took a life, it must do so with the gravest humility and greatest care.
FROM:
SUNDAY UNEKWUOJO SAMSAN